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Author Chalmers, Alan.
Title What is this thing called science?.
Publication Info St Lucia : University of Queensland Press, 2013.
Edition 4th ed.



Descript 1 online resource (304 p.)
Edition 4th ed.
Note Description based upon print version of record.
Contents Front Cover -- About the Author -- Title page -- Copyright -- Epigraph -- Contents -- Preface to the first edition -- Preface to the second edition -- Preface to the third edition -- Preface to the fourth edition -- Introduction -- CHAPTER 1 Science as knowledge derived from the facts of experience -- A widely held commonsense view of science -- Seeing is believing -- Visual experiences not determined solely by theobject viewed -- Observable facts expressed as statements -- Why should facts precede theory? -- The fallibility of observation statements -- Further reading
CHAPTER 2 Observation as practical intervention -- Observation: passive and private or active and public? -- Galileo and the moons of Jupiter -- Observable facts objective but fallible -- Further reading -- CHAPTER 3 Experiment -- Not just facts but relevant facts -- The production and updating of experimental results -- Transforming the experimental base of science: historical examples -- Experiment as an adequate basis for science -- Further reading -- CHAPTER 4 Deriving theories from the facts: induction -- Introduction -- Baby logic -- Can scientific laws be derived from the facts?
What constitutes a good inductive argument? -- Further problems with inductivism -- The appeal of inductivism -- Further reading -- CHAPTER 5 Introducing falsificationism -- Introduction -- A logical point in favour of falsificationism -- Falsifiability as a criterion for theories -- Degree of falsifiability, clarity and precision -- Falsificationism and progress -- Further reading -- CHAPTER 6 Sophisticated falsificationism, novel predictions and the growth of science -- Relative rather than absolute degrees of falsifiability -- Increasing falsifiability and ad hoc modifications
Confirmation in the falsificationist account of science -- Boldness, novelty and background knowledge -- Comparison of the inductivist and falsificationist view of confirmation -- Advantages of falsificationism over inductivism -- Further reading -- CHAPTER 7 The limitations of falsificationism -- Problems stemming from the logical situation -- Falsificationism inadequate on historical grounds -- The Copernican Revolution -- Inadequacies of the falsificationist demarcation criterion and Popper's response -- Further reading -- CHAPTER 8 Theories as structures I: Kuhn's paradigms
Theories as structures -- Introducing Thomas Kuhn -- Paradigms and normal science -- Crisis and revolution -- The function of normal science and revolutions -- The merits of Kuhn's account of science -- Kuhn's ambivalence on progress through revolutions -- Objective knowledge -- Further reading -- CHAPTER 9 Theories as structures II: research programs -- Introducing Imre Lakatos -- Lakatos's research programs -- Methodology within a program and the comparison of programs -- Novel predictions -- Testing the methodology against history -- Problems with Lakatos's methodology -- Further reading
CHAPTER 10 Feyerabend's anarchistic theory of science
Note Unlimited number of concurrent users. UkHlHU
ISBN 9780702250866
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Author Chalmers, Alan.
Subject Science -- Philosophy.
Descript 1 online resource (304 p.)
Edition 4th ed.
Note Description based upon print version of record.
Contents Front Cover -- About the Author -- Title page -- Copyright -- Epigraph -- Contents -- Preface to the first edition -- Preface to the second edition -- Preface to the third edition -- Preface to the fourth edition -- Introduction -- CHAPTER 1 Science as knowledge derived from the facts of experience -- A widely held commonsense view of science -- Seeing is believing -- Visual experiences not determined solely by theobject viewed -- Observable facts expressed as statements -- Why should facts precede theory? -- The fallibility of observation statements -- Further reading
CHAPTER 2 Observation as practical intervention -- Observation: passive and private or active and public? -- Galileo and the moons of Jupiter -- Observable facts objective but fallible -- Further reading -- CHAPTER 3 Experiment -- Not just facts but relevant facts -- The production and updating of experimental results -- Transforming the experimental base of science: historical examples -- Experiment as an adequate basis for science -- Further reading -- CHAPTER 4 Deriving theories from the facts: induction -- Introduction -- Baby logic -- Can scientific laws be derived from the facts?
What constitutes a good inductive argument? -- Further problems with inductivism -- The appeal of inductivism -- Further reading -- CHAPTER 5 Introducing falsificationism -- Introduction -- A logical point in favour of falsificationism -- Falsifiability as a criterion for theories -- Degree of falsifiability, clarity and precision -- Falsificationism and progress -- Further reading -- CHAPTER 6 Sophisticated falsificationism, novel predictions and the growth of science -- Relative rather than absolute degrees of falsifiability -- Increasing falsifiability and ad hoc modifications
Confirmation in the falsificationist account of science -- Boldness, novelty and background knowledge -- Comparison of the inductivist and falsificationist view of confirmation -- Advantages of falsificationism over inductivism -- Further reading -- CHAPTER 7 The limitations of falsificationism -- Problems stemming from the logical situation -- Falsificationism inadequate on historical grounds -- The Copernican Revolution -- Inadequacies of the falsificationist demarcation criterion and Popper's response -- Further reading -- CHAPTER 8 Theories as structures I: Kuhn's paradigms
Theories as structures -- Introducing Thomas Kuhn -- Paradigms and normal science -- Crisis and revolution -- The function of normal science and revolutions -- The merits of Kuhn's account of science -- Kuhn's ambivalence on progress through revolutions -- Objective knowledge -- Further reading -- CHAPTER 9 Theories as structures II: research programs -- Introducing Imre Lakatos -- Lakatos's research programs -- Methodology within a program and the comparison of programs -- Novel predictions -- Testing the methodology against history -- Problems with Lakatos's methodology -- Further reading
CHAPTER 10 Feyerabend's anarchistic theory of science
Note Unlimited number of concurrent users. UkHlHU
ISBN 9780702250866
Author Chalmers, Alan.
Subject Science -- Philosophy.

Subject Science -- Philosophy.
Descript 1 online resource (304 p.)
Note Description based upon print version of record.
Contents Front Cover -- About the Author -- Title page -- Copyright -- Epigraph -- Contents -- Preface to the first edition -- Preface to the second edition -- Preface to the third edition -- Preface to the fourth edition -- Introduction -- CHAPTER 1 Science as knowledge derived from the facts of experience -- A widely held commonsense view of science -- Seeing is believing -- Visual experiences not determined solely by theobject viewed -- Observable facts expressed as statements -- Why should facts precede theory? -- The fallibility of observation statements -- Further reading
CHAPTER 2 Observation as practical intervention -- Observation: passive and private or active and public? -- Galileo and the moons of Jupiter -- Observable facts objective but fallible -- Further reading -- CHAPTER 3 Experiment -- Not just facts but relevant facts -- The production and updating of experimental results -- Transforming the experimental base of science: historical examples -- Experiment as an adequate basis for science -- Further reading -- CHAPTER 4 Deriving theories from the facts: induction -- Introduction -- Baby logic -- Can scientific laws be derived from the facts?
What constitutes a good inductive argument? -- Further problems with inductivism -- The appeal of inductivism -- Further reading -- CHAPTER 5 Introducing falsificationism -- Introduction -- A logical point in favour of falsificationism -- Falsifiability as a criterion for theories -- Degree of falsifiability, clarity and precision -- Falsificationism and progress -- Further reading -- CHAPTER 6 Sophisticated falsificationism, novel predictions and the growth of science -- Relative rather than absolute degrees of falsifiability -- Increasing falsifiability and ad hoc modifications
Confirmation in the falsificationist account of science -- Boldness, novelty and background knowledge -- Comparison of the inductivist and falsificationist view of confirmation -- Advantages of falsificationism over inductivism -- Further reading -- CHAPTER 7 The limitations of falsificationism -- Problems stemming from the logical situation -- Falsificationism inadequate on historical grounds -- The Copernican Revolution -- Inadequacies of the falsificationist demarcation criterion and Popper's response -- Further reading -- CHAPTER 8 Theories as structures I: Kuhn's paradigms
Theories as structures -- Introducing Thomas Kuhn -- Paradigms and normal science -- Crisis and revolution -- The function of normal science and revolutions -- The merits of Kuhn's account of science -- Kuhn's ambivalence on progress through revolutions -- Objective knowledge -- Further reading -- CHAPTER 9 Theories as structures II: research programs -- Introducing Imre Lakatos -- Lakatos's research programs -- Methodology within a program and the comparison of programs -- Novel predictions -- Testing the methodology against history -- Problems with Lakatos's methodology -- Further reading
CHAPTER 10 Feyerabend's anarchistic theory of science
Note Unlimited number of concurrent users. UkHlHU
ISBN 9780702250866

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