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Title Intelligence and national security policymaking on Iraq : British and American perspectives / edited by James P. Pfiffner and Mark Phythian.
Publisher Manchester, UK : Manchester University Press, 2018.
Copyright date ©2008


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Descript 1 online resource (xiii, 296 pages) : illustrations; digital, PDF file(s).
Content text txt
Media computer c
Carrier online resource cr
Note First published in print form: 2008.
Contents List of tables and figures --Acknowledgements --Contributors --1. Introduction: policy-making and intelligence on Iraq / James P. Pfiffner and Mark Phythian --Part I: Intellectual antecedents of the Iraq War --2. The neoconservative roots of the war in Iraq / John Dumbrell --3. The origins of the British decision to go to war: Tony Blair, humanitarian intervention and the 'New Doctrine of the International Community' / Jim Whitman --Part II: The public case for war --4. Did President Bush mislead the country in his arguments for war with Iraq? / James P. Pfiffner --5. The British road to war: decision-making, intelligence and the case for war in Iraq / Mark Phythian --6. Australian use of intelligence and the case for war in Iraq / Rodney Tiffen --7. The Iraq War and the management of American public opinion / John Mueller --Part III: Intelligence failure --8. Intelligence collection and analysis on Iraq: issues for the intelligence community / Richard Kerr, Thomas Wolfe, Rebecca Donegan, and Aris Pappas --9. The politics and psychology of intelligence and intelligence reform / Robert Jervis --10. Congress, the Iraq War, and the failures of intelligence oversight / Loch K. Johnson --11. Flawed intelligence, limited oversight: official inquiries into pre-war UK intelligence on Iraq / Mark Phythian --Part IV: Policy failure --12. Decision-making, intelligence, and the Iraq War / James P. Pfiffner --13. Intelligence, policy, and the war in Iraq / Paul R. Pillar --Part V: Excerpts from key speeches and documents concerning the war --Appendix A: Excerpts from key U.S. speeches before the war in Iraq --Appendix B: Excerpts from key UK speeches and documents before the war in Iraq --Appendix C: October 2002 National Intelligence estimate: key judgments (excerpts) --Appendix D: Excerpts from post-war U.S. investigations --Appendix E: Letter to George Tenet from U.S. intelligence professionals, 28 April 2007.
Note In English.
ISBN 9781526130969 (eBook)
9780719077463 (hardback)
9780719077470 (paperback)
Standard # 10.7765/9781526130969 doi
 Click on the terms below to find similar items in the catalogue
Series Manchester Security, Conflict & Peace
Subject Iraq War, 2003- -- Military intelligence -- United States.
Iraq War, 2003- -- Military intelligence -- Great Britain.
National security -- United States -- Decision making.
National security -- Great Britain -- Decision making.
Iraq War, 2003- -- Causes.
United States -- Military relations -- Iraq.
Great Britain -- Military relations -- Iraq.
United States -- Military policy.
Great Britain -- Military policy.
Alt author Pfiffner, James P., editor.
Phythian, Mark, editor.
Manchester University Press, publisher.
Descript 1 online resource (xiii, 296 pages) : illustrations; digital, PDF file(s).
Content text txt
Media computer c
Carrier online resource cr
Note First published in print form: 2008.
Contents List of tables and figures --Acknowledgements --Contributors --1. Introduction: policy-making and intelligence on Iraq / James P. Pfiffner and Mark Phythian --Part I: Intellectual antecedents of the Iraq War --2. The neoconservative roots of the war in Iraq / John Dumbrell --3. The origins of the British decision to go to war: Tony Blair, humanitarian intervention and the 'New Doctrine of the International Community' / Jim Whitman --Part II: The public case for war --4. Did President Bush mislead the country in his arguments for war with Iraq? / James P. Pfiffner --5. The British road to war: decision-making, intelligence and the case for war in Iraq / Mark Phythian --6. Australian use of intelligence and the case for war in Iraq / Rodney Tiffen --7. The Iraq War and the management of American public opinion / John Mueller --Part III: Intelligence failure --8. Intelligence collection and analysis on Iraq: issues for the intelligence community / Richard Kerr, Thomas Wolfe, Rebecca Donegan, and Aris Pappas --9. The politics and psychology of intelligence and intelligence reform / Robert Jervis --10. Congress, the Iraq War, and the failures of intelligence oversight / Loch K. Johnson --11. Flawed intelligence, limited oversight: official inquiries into pre-war UK intelligence on Iraq / Mark Phythian --Part IV: Policy failure --12. Decision-making, intelligence, and the Iraq War / James P. Pfiffner --13. Intelligence, policy, and the war in Iraq / Paul R. Pillar --Part V: Excerpts from key speeches and documents concerning the war --Appendix A: Excerpts from key U.S. speeches before the war in Iraq --Appendix B: Excerpts from key UK speeches and documents before the war in Iraq --Appendix C: October 2002 National Intelligence estimate: key judgments (excerpts) --Appendix D: Excerpts from post-war U.S. investigations --Appendix E: Letter to George Tenet from U.S. intelligence professionals, 28 April 2007.
Note In English.
ISBN 9781526130969 (eBook)
9780719077463 (hardback)
9780719077470 (paperback)
Standard # 10.7765/9781526130969 doi
Series Manchester Security, Conflict & Peace
Subject Iraq War, 2003- -- Military intelligence -- United States.
Iraq War, 2003- -- Military intelligence -- Great Britain.
National security -- United States -- Decision making.
National security -- Great Britain -- Decision making.
Iraq War, 2003- -- Causes.
United States -- Military relations -- Iraq.
Great Britain -- Military relations -- Iraq.
United States -- Military policy.
Great Britain -- Military policy.
Alt author Pfiffner, James P., editor.
Phythian, Mark, editor.
Manchester University Press, publisher.

Subject Iraq War, 2003- -- Military intelligence -- United States.
Iraq War, 2003- -- Military intelligence -- Great Britain.
National security -- United States -- Decision making.
National security -- Great Britain -- Decision making.
Iraq War, 2003- -- Causes.
United States -- Military relations -- Iraq.
Great Britain -- Military relations -- Iraq.
United States -- Military policy.
Great Britain -- Military policy.
Descript 1 online resource (xiii, 296 pages) : illustrations; digital, PDF file(s).
Content text txt
Media computer c
Carrier online resource cr
Note First published in print form: 2008.
Contents List of tables and figures --Acknowledgements --Contributors --1. Introduction: policy-making and intelligence on Iraq / James P. Pfiffner and Mark Phythian --Part I: Intellectual antecedents of the Iraq War --2. The neoconservative roots of the war in Iraq / John Dumbrell --3. The origins of the British decision to go to war: Tony Blair, humanitarian intervention and the 'New Doctrine of the International Community' / Jim Whitman --Part II: The public case for war --4. Did President Bush mislead the country in his arguments for war with Iraq? / James P. Pfiffner --5. The British road to war: decision-making, intelligence and the case for war in Iraq / Mark Phythian --6. Australian use of intelligence and the case for war in Iraq / Rodney Tiffen --7. The Iraq War and the management of American public opinion / John Mueller --Part III: Intelligence failure --8. Intelligence collection and analysis on Iraq: issues for the intelligence community / Richard Kerr, Thomas Wolfe, Rebecca Donegan, and Aris Pappas --9. The politics and psychology of intelligence and intelligence reform / Robert Jervis --10. Congress, the Iraq War, and the failures of intelligence oversight / Loch K. Johnson --11. Flawed intelligence, limited oversight: official inquiries into pre-war UK intelligence on Iraq / Mark Phythian --Part IV: Policy failure --12. Decision-making, intelligence, and the Iraq War / James P. Pfiffner --13. Intelligence, policy, and the war in Iraq / Paul R. Pillar --Part V: Excerpts from key speeches and documents concerning the war --Appendix A: Excerpts from key U.S. speeches before the war in Iraq --Appendix B: Excerpts from key UK speeches and documents before the war in Iraq --Appendix C: October 2002 National Intelligence estimate: key judgments (excerpts) --Appendix D: Excerpts from post-war U.S. investigations --Appendix E: Letter to George Tenet from U.S. intelligence professionals, 28 April 2007.
Note In English.
Alt author Pfiffner, James P., editor.
Phythian, Mark, editor.
Manchester University Press, publisher.
ISBN 9781526130969 (eBook)
9780719077463 (hardback)
9780719077470 (paperback)
Standard # 10.7765/9781526130969 doi
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