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Author Bar-Joseph, Uri.
Title Intelligence success and failure : the human factor / Uri Bar-Joseph and Rose McDermott.
Publication Info New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2017]



Descript xiv, 262 pages ; 24 cm
Contents Machine generated contents note: -- Contents -- Introduction -- Part One: The Theoretical Framework -- Chapter I. Surprise Attack: A Framework for Discussion -- Chapter II. Examining the Learning Process -- Part Two: The Empirical Evidence -- The First Dyad: Barbarossa and the Battle for Moscow -- Case Study I: The Failure -- Case Study II: Success: The Battle for Moscow -- The Second Dyad: The USA in the Korean War -- Case study I: Failing to Forecast the War -- Case Study II: Failure II: The Chinese Intervention of Fall 1950 -- The Third Dyad: Intelligence Failure and Success in the War of Yom Kippur -- Case Study I: The Failure -- Case Study II: The Success -- Chapter VI. Conclusions.
ISBN 9780199341733 (hardback)
9780199341740 (paperback)
9780199341757 (updf)
Click on the terms below to find similar items in the catalogue
Author Bar-Joseph, Uri.
Subject Military intelligence -- Decision making -- Psychological aspects.
Surprise (Military science)
World War, 1939-1945 -- Military intelligence -- Soviet Union.
orean War, 1950-1953 -- Military intelligence -- United States.
Israel-Arab War, 1973 -- Military intelligence -- Israel.
Alt author McDermott, Rose, 1962-
Descript xiv, 262 pages ; 24 cm
Contents Machine generated contents note: -- Contents -- Introduction -- Part One: The Theoretical Framework -- Chapter I. Surprise Attack: A Framework for Discussion -- Chapter II. Examining the Learning Process -- Part Two: The Empirical Evidence -- The First Dyad: Barbarossa and the Battle for Moscow -- Case Study I: The Failure -- Case Study II: Success: The Battle for Moscow -- The Second Dyad: The USA in the Korean War -- Case study I: Failing to Forecast the War -- Case Study II: Failure II: The Chinese Intervention of Fall 1950 -- The Third Dyad: Intelligence Failure and Success in the War of Yom Kippur -- Case Study I: The Failure -- Case Study II: The Success -- Chapter VI. Conclusions.
ISBN 9780199341733 (hardback)
9780199341740 (paperback)
9780199341757 (updf)
Author Bar-Joseph, Uri.
Subject Military intelligence -- Decision making -- Psychological aspects.
Surprise (Military science)
World War, 1939-1945 -- Military intelligence -- Soviet Union.
orean War, 1950-1953 -- Military intelligence -- United States.
Israel-Arab War, 1973 -- Military intelligence -- Israel.
Alt author McDermott, Rose, 1962-

Subject Military intelligence -- Decision making -- Psychological aspects.
Surprise (Military science)
World War, 1939-1945 -- Military intelligence -- Soviet Union.
orean War, 1950-1953 -- Military intelligence -- United States.
Israel-Arab War, 1973 -- Military intelligence -- Israel.
Descript xiv, 262 pages ; 24 cm
Contents Machine generated contents note: -- Contents -- Introduction -- Part One: The Theoretical Framework -- Chapter I. Surprise Attack: A Framework for Discussion -- Chapter II. Examining the Learning Process -- Part Two: The Empirical Evidence -- The First Dyad: Barbarossa and the Battle for Moscow -- Case Study I: The Failure -- Case Study II: Success: The Battle for Moscow -- The Second Dyad: The USA in the Korean War -- Case study I: Failing to Forecast the War -- Case Study II: Failure II: The Chinese Intervention of Fall 1950 -- The Third Dyad: Intelligence Failure and Success in the War of Yom Kippur -- Case Study I: The Failure -- Case Study II: The Success -- Chapter VI. Conclusions.
Alt author McDermott, Rose, 1962-
ISBN 9780199341733 (hardback)
9780199341740 (paperback)
9780199341757 (updf)

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