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Author Büchelhofer, Christian.
Title Corporate Control and Enterprise Reform in China [electronic resource] : An Econometric Analysis of Block Share Trades / by Christian Büchelhofer.
Publication Info Heidelberg : Physica-Verlag HD, 2008.



Descript XII, 115 p. online resource.
text file PDF rda
Contents Introduction -- China's reform process, stock market development, and testable hypotheses -- Data, concept of control, and summary statistics on changes in control -- Causes of changes in ultimate share ownership -- Consequences of changes in ultimate share ownership -- Conclusion.
Note This study sheds light on the efficiency of corporate control allocation in Chinese listed firms. Using a panel data set for the period 1996 to 2006, it examines the frequency, causes and consequences of changes in corporate control. The results indicate that poorly performing firms are the predominant targets of control changes; shareholder and creditor control generally act as a complement for changes in control. Following the change in ownership there is a substantial amount of corporate restructuring and an improvement in operating performance. Significant differences in these dimensions emerge, however, between State and private transfers of control. The findings not only provide insights into the motives and constraints of the key players involved in governance practices in China; but they also contain useful implications for other emerging markets around the world that have weak legal systems and weak property rights protection.
ISBN 9783790820201
Standard # 10.1007/978-3-7908-2020-1 doi
Click on the terms below to find similar items in the catalogue
Author Büchelhofer, Christian.
Series Contributions to Economics,
Contributions to Economics, 1431-1933
Subject Economics.
Development Economics.
Industrial organization (Economic theory).
Banks and banking.
Alt author SpringerLink (Online service)
Descript XII, 115 p. online resource.
text file PDF rda
Contents Introduction -- China's reform process, stock market development, and testable hypotheses -- Data, concept of control, and summary statistics on changes in control -- Causes of changes in ultimate share ownership -- Consequences of changes in ultimate share ownership -- Conclusion.
Note This study sheds light on the efficiency of corporate control allocation in Chinese listed firms. Using a panel data set for the period 1996 to 2006, it examines the frequency, causes and consequences of changes in corporate control. The results indicate that poorly performing firms are the predominant targets of control changes; shareholder and creditor control generally act as a complement for changes in control. Following the change in ownership there is a substantial amount of corporate restructuring and an improvement in operating performance. Significant differences in these dimensions emerge, however, between State and private transfers of control. The findings not only provide insights into the motives and constraints of the key players involved in governance practices in China; but they also contain useful implications for other emerging markets around the world that have weak legal systems and weak property rights protection.
ISBN 9783790820201
Standard # 10.1007/978-3-7908-2020-1 doi
Author Büchelhofer, Christian.
Series Contributions to Economics,
Contributions to Economics, 1431-1933
Subject Economics.
Development Economics.
Industrial organization (Economic theory).
Banks and banking.
Alt author SpringerLink (Online service)

Subject Economics.
Development Economics.
Industrial organization (Economic theory).
Banks and banking.
Descript XII, 115 p. online resource.
text file PDF rda
Contents Introduction -- China's reform process, stock market development, and testable hypotheses -- Data, concept of control, and summary statistics on changes in control -- Causes of changes in ultimate share ownership -- Consequences of changes in ultimate share ownership -- Conclusion.
Note This study sheds light on the efficiency of corporate control allocation in Chinese listed firms. Using a panel data set for the period 1996 to 2006, it examines the frequency, causes and consequences of changes in corporate control. The results indicate that poorly performing firms are the predominant targets of control changes; shareholder and creditor control generally act as a complement for changes in control. Following the change in ownership there is a substantial amount of corporate restructuring and an improvement in operating performance. Significant differences in these dimensions emerge, however, between State and private transfers of control. The findings not only provide insights into the motives and constraints of the key players involved in governance practices in China; but they also contain useful implications for other emerging markets around the world that have weak legal systems and weak property rights protection.
Alt author SpringerLink (Online service)
ISBN 9783790820201
Standard # 10.1007/978-3-7908-2020-1 doi

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