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Author Stoljar, Daniel.
Title Ignorance and imagination : the epistemic origin of the problem of consciousness / Daniel Stoljar.
Publication Info New York ; Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2009.



Descript 272 p.
Note Originally published: 2006.
Presenting a way to resolve the central philosophical problem about the mind: how it is that consciousness or experience fits into a larger naturalistic picture of the world, this book argues that the correct response to the problem is to view it as a consequence of our ignorance of the relevant physical facts.
Ignorance and Imagination advances a novel way to resolve the central philosophical problem about the mind: how it is that consciousness or experience fits into a larger naturalistic picture of the world. The correct response to the problem, Stoljar argues, is not to posit a realm of experience distinct from the physical, nor to deny the reality of phenomenal experience, nor even to rethink our understanding of consciousness and the language we use to talk about it. Instead, we should view the problem itself as a consequence of our ignorance of the relevant physical facts, Stoljar shows that this change of orientation is well motivated historically, empirically, and philosophically, and that it has none of the side effects it is sometimes thought to have. The result is a philosophical perspective on the mind that has a number of far-reaching consequences: for consciousness studies, for our place in nature, and for the way we think about the relationship between philosophy and science.
200 annual accesses. UkHlHU
ISBN 9780198041856 (e-book)
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Author Stoljar, Daniel.
Series Philosophy of mind series
Subject Consciousness.
Epistemics.
Descript 272 p.
Note Originally published: 2006.
Presenting a way to resolve the central philosophical problem about the mind: how it is that consciousness or experience fits into a larger naturalistic picture of the world, this book argues that the correct response to the problem is to view it as a consequence of our ignorance of the relevant physical facts.
Ignorance and Imagination advances a novel way to resolve the central philosophical problem about the mind: how it is that consciousness or experience fits into a larger naturalistic picture of the world. The correct response to the problem, Stoljar argues, is not to posit a realm of experience distinct from the physical, nor to deny the reality of phenomenal experience, nor even to rethink our understanding of consciousness and the language we use to talk about it. Instead, we should view the problem itself as a consequence of our ignorance of the relevant physical facts, Stoljar shows that this change of orientation is well motivated historically, empirically, and philosophically, and that it has none of the side effects it is sometimes thought to have. The result is a philosophical perspective on the mind that has a number of far-reaching consequences: for consciousness studies, for our place in nature, and for the way we think about the relationship between philosophy and science.
200 annual accesses. UkHlHU
ISBN 9780198041856 (e-book)
Author Stoljar, Daniel.
Series Philosophy of mind series
Subject Consciousness.
Epistemics.

Subject Consciousness.
Epistemics.
Descript 272 p.
Note Originally published: 2006.
Presenting a way to resolve the central philosophical problem about the mind: how it is that consciousness or experience fits into a larger naturalistic picture of the world, this book argues that the correct response to the problem is to view it as a consequence of our ignorance of the relevant physical facts.
Ignorance and Imagination advances a novel way to resolve the central philosophical problem about the mind: how it is that consciousness or experience fits into a larger naturalistic picture of the world. The correct response to the problem, Stoljar argues, is not to posit a realm of experience distinct from the physical, nor to deny the reality of phenomenal experience, nor even to rethink our understanding of consciousness and the language we use to talk about it. Instead, we should view the problem itself as a consequence of our ignorance of the relevant physical facts, Stoljar shows that this change of orientation is well motivated historically, empirically, and philosophically, and that it has none of the side effects it is sometimes thought to have. The result is a philosophical perspective on the mind that has a number of far-reaching consequences: for consciousness studies, for our place in nature, and for the way we think about the relationship between philosophy and science.
200 annual accesses. UkHlHU
ISBN 9780198041856 (e-book)

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