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Author Herring, Jonathan.
Title Law and the Relational Self.
Publisher Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2019.
Copyright date ©2019.


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Descript 1 online resource (214 pages)
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Contents Cover -- Half-title -- Series information -- International Journal of Law in Context: A Global Forum forInterdisciplinary Legal Studies -- Title page -- Copyright information -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Table of Cases -- Table of Legislation -- 1 The Concept of the Relational Self -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 The Traditional Individualised Understanding of the Self -- 1.2.1 The Self as Unique -- 1.2.2 The Self over Time -- 1.2.3 The Self, Property and Bodies -- 1.3 Theories of the Individual Self -- 1.3.1 The Bodily Self -- 1.3.2 The Psychological Self -- 1.3.3 The Soul -- 1.4 A Rejection of the Individual Self -- 1.5 The Relational Self -- 1.6 Autonomy -- 1.7 Disability -- 1.8 Conclusion -- 2 Law and the Vulnerable Self -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Introducing Vulnerability -- 2.3 Defining Vulnerability -- 2.3.1 Internal and External Elements -- 2.3.2 Subjective/Objective Understanding of Vulnerability -- 2.4 Who Is Vulnerable? -- 2.4.1 Particular and Deficient Vulnerability -- 2.4.2 Universal Beneficial Vulnerability -- 2.5 All the Time or Some of the Time? -- 2.6 The Significance of the Claim That We Are All Vulnerable -- 2.6.1 Our Image of the Legal Self -- 2.6.2 Autonomy -- 2.6.3 Duties to the Vulnerable -- 2.6.4 The Goodness of Vulnerability -- 2.6.5 Vulnerability and Power -- 2.7 Criticisms of the Claim -- 2.8 Conclusion -- 3 Law and the Caring Self -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 The Definition of Care -- 3.2.1 Meeting Needs -- 3.2.2 Respect -- 3.2.3 Responsibility -- 3.2.4 Relationality -- 3.3 Care Ethics -- 3.3.1 Care Is Part of Being Human -- 3.3.2 Emotions Are Ethically Significant -- 3.3.3 Intermingled Interests -- 3.3.4 The Importance of Responsibilities -- 3.3.5 The Importance of Non-Abstraction -- 3.3.6 Gender and an Ethics of Care -- 3.4 The Disability Critique of Care Ethics -- 3.5 Care Ethics and the Law.
3.6 State Support of Care -- 3.7 Conclusion -- 4 Law and the Abused Self -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Statistics -- 4.3 Defining Intimate Abuse -- 4.3.1 International Definitions -- 4.3.2 UK Governmental Definitions -- 4.3.3 Discussions of Domestic Violence Definitions -- 4.4 Developing a Definition -- 4.4.1 Intimate Abuse as 'Coercive Control' -- 4.4.2 Intimate Abuse as a Breach of Trust of an Intimate Relationship -- 4.4.3 Intimate Abuse and Structural Inequality -- 4.5 Intimate Abuse and Children -- 4.6 Developing a Legal Response -- 4.7 Conclusion -- 5 Medical Law and the Relational Self -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Bodies and Body Ownership -- 5.2.1 The Traditional Common Law Approach: Res Nullius -- 5.2.2 The Case for Property -- 5.2.3 The Case for a Relational Understanding -- 5.2.4 Resolving Cases -- 5.2.4.1 Yearworth v. North Bristol NHS Trust -- 5.2.4.2 A, B and Others v. Leeds Teaching Hospital -- 5.2.4.3 Evans v. UK -- 5.2.5 Conclusion on Body Parts -- 5.3 Capacity -- 5.3.1 Autonomy and Capacity -- 5.3.2 Individualised Assessment of Capacity -- 5.3.3 The Presumption of Capacity -- 5.3.4 Blurring the Capacity/Non-capacity Line -- 5.3.5 Solving the Problem -- 5.3.6 Conclusions on Capacity -- 5.4 Best Interests -- 5.5 Personhood -- 5.5.1 Mental Capacities -- 5.5.2 Challenges to the Mental Capacities Approach -- 5.5.3 Membership of a Human Community -- 5.5.4 Problems with the Membership of Human Community Approach -- 5.5.5 Developing a Relational Account of Personhood -- 5.5.6 Pregnancy -- 5.6 Conclusion -- 6 Family Law and the Relational Self -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 The Family of Family Law -- 6.2.1 The Community Model -- 6.2.2 The Contractual Model -- 6.2.3 Rights-Based Model -- 6.2.4 Caring Family Law -- 6.3 Remedying Unequal Distribution of Relational Advantages or Disadvantages -- 6.3.1 Pre-Nuptial Agreements -- 6.4 Parenthood.
6.5 Parental Responsibility -- 6.6 Disputes over Children -- 6.7 Conclusion -- 7 Criminal Law and the Relational Self -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Relational Harms -- 7.2.1 Dhaliwal -- 7.2.2 Marital Rape -- 7.2.3 BDSM -- 7.2.4 Acknowledgement of Relational Harms -- 7.3 Consent and the Criminal Law -- 7.3.1 Theft -- 7.3.2 Consent to Sexual Relations -- 7.4 Exploitation -- 7.5 Relational Blame and Joint Enterprise -- 7.6 Conclusion -- 8 Concluding Thoughts -- Index.
ISBN 9781108637497 (electronic bk.)
 Click on the terms below to find similar items in the catalogue
Author Herring, Jonathan.
Series Law in Context
Law in Context
Descript 1 online resource (214 pages)
Content text txt
Media computer c
Carrier online resource cr
Contents Cover -- Half-title -- Series information -- International Journal of Law in Context: A Global Forum forInterdisciplinary Legal Studies -- Title page -- Copyright information -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Table of Cases -- Table of Legislation -- 1 The Concept of the Relational Self -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 The Traditional Individualised Understanding of the Self -- 1.2.1 The Self as Unique -- 1.2.2 The Self over Time -- 1.2.3 The Self, Property and Bodies -- 1.3 Theories of the Individual Self -- 1.3.1 The Bodily Self -- 1.3.2 The Psychological Self -- 1.3.3 The Soul -- 1.4 A Rejection of the Individual Self -- 1.5 The Relational Self -- 1.6 Autonomy -- 1.7 Disability -- 1.8 Conclusion -- 2 Law and the Vulnerable Self -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Introducing Vulnerability -- 2.3 Defining Vulnerability -- 2.3.1 Internal and External Elements -- 2.3.2 Subjective/Objective Understanding of Vulnerability -- 2.4 Who Is Vulnerable? -- 2.4.1 Particular and Deficient Vulnerability -- 2.4.2 Universal Beneficial Vulnerability -- 2.5 All the Time or Some of the Time? -- 2.6 The Significance of the Claim That We Are All Vulnerable -- 2.6.1 Our Image of the Legal Self -- 2.6.2 Autonomy -- 2.6.3 Duties to the Vulnerable -- 2.6.4 The Goodness of Vulnerability -- 2.6.5 Vulnerability and Power -- 2.7 Criticisms of the Claim -- 2.8 Conclusion -- 3 Law and the Caring Self -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 The Definition of Care -- 3.2.1 Meeting Needs -- 3.2.2 Respect -- 3.2.3 Responsibility -- 3.2.4 Relationality -- 3.3 Care Ethics -- 3.3.1 Care Is Part of Being Human -- 3.3.2 Emotions Are Ethically Significant -- 3.3.3 Intermingled Interests -- 3.3.4 The Importance of Responsibilities -- 3.3.5 The Importance of Non-Abstraction -- 3.3.6 Gender and an Ethics of Care -- 3.4 The Disability Critique of Care Ethics -- 3.5 Care Ethics and the Law.
3.6 State Support of Care -- 3.7 Conclusion -- 4 Law and the Abused Self -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Statistics -- 4.3 Defining Intimate Abuse -- 4.3.1 International Definitions -- 4.3.2 UK Governmental Definitions -- 4.3.3 Discussions of Domestic Violence Definitions -- 4.4 Developing a Definition -- 4.4.1 Intimate Abuse as 'Coercive Control' -- 4.4.2 Intimate Abuse as a Breach of Trust of an Intimate Relationship -- 4.4.3 Intimate Abuse and Structural Inequality -- 4.5 Intimate Abuse and Children -- 4.6 Developing a Legal Response -- 4.7 Conclusion -- 5 Medical Law and the Relational Self -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Bodies and Body Ownership -- 5.2.1 The Traditional Common Law Approach: Res Nullius -- 5.2.2 The Case for Property -- 5.2.3 The Case for a Relational Understanding -- 5.2.4 Resolving Cases -- 5.2.4.1 Yearworth v. North Bristol NHS Trust -- 5.2.4.2 A, B and Others v. Leeds Teaching Hospital -- 5.2.4.3 Evans v. UK -- 5.2.5 Conclusion on Body Parts -- 5.3 Capacity -- 5.3.1 Autonomy and Capacity -- 5.3.2 Individualised Assessment of Capacity -- 5.3.3 The Presumption of Capacity -- 5.3.4 Blurring the Capacity/Non-capacity Line -- 5.3.5 Solving the Problem -- 5.3.6 Conclusions on Capacity -- 5.4 Best Interests -- 5.5 Personhood -- 5.5.1 Mental Capacities -- 5.5.2 Challenges to the Mental Capacities Approach -- 5.5.3 Membership of a Human Community -- 5.5.4 Problems with the Membership of Human Community Approach -- 5.5.5 Developing a Relational Account of Personhood -- 5.5.6 Pregnancy -- 5.6 Conclusion -- 6 Family Law and the Relational Self -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 The Family of Family Law -- 6.2.1 The Community Model -- 6.2.2 The Contractual Model -- 6.2.3 Rights-Based Model -- 6.2.4 Caring Family Law -- 6.3 Remedying Unequal Distribution of Relational Advantages or Disadvantages -- 6.3.1 Pre-Nuptial Agreements -- 6.4 Parenthood.
6.5 Parental Responsibility -- 6.6 Disputes over Children -- 6.7 Conclusion -- 7 Criminal Law and the Relational Self -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Relational Harms -- 7.2.1 Dhaliwal -- 7.2.2 Marital Rape -- 7.2.3 BDSM -- 7.2.4 Acknowledgement of Relational Harms -- 7.3 Consent and the Criminal Law -- 7.3.1 Theft -- 7.3.2 Consent to Sexual Relations -- 7.4 Exploitation -- 7.5 Relational Blame and Joint Enterprise -- 7.6 Conclusion -- 8 Concluding Thoughts -- Index.
ISBN 9781108637497 (electronic bk.)
Author Herring, Jonathan.
Series Law in Context
Law in Context

Descript 1 online resource (214 pages)
Content text txt
Media computer c
Carrier online resource cr
Contents Cover -- Half-title -- Series information -- International Journal of Law in Context: A Global Forum forInterdisciplinary Legal Studies -- Title page -- Copyright information -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Table of Cases -- Table of Legislation -- 1 The Concept of the Relational Self -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 The Traditional Individualised Understanding of the Self -- 1.2.1 The Self as Unique -- 1.2.2 The Self over Time -- 1.2.3 The Self, Property and Bodies -- 1.3 Theories of the Individual Self -- 1.3.1 The Bodily Self -- 1.3.2 The Psychological Self -- 1.3.3 The Soul -- 1.4 A Rejection of the Individual Self -- 1.5 The Relational Self -- 1.6 Autonomy -- 1.7 Disability -- 1.8 Conclusion -- 2 Law and the Vulnerable Self -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Introducing Vulnerability -- 2.3 Defining Vulnerability -- 2.3.1 Internal and External Elements -- 2.3.2 Subjective/Objective Understanding of Vulnerability -- 2.4 Who Is Vulnerable? -- 2.4.1 Particular and Deficient Vulnerability -- 2.4.2 Universal Beneficial Vulnerability -- 2.5 All the Time or Some of the Time? -- 2.6 The Significance of the Claim That We Are All Vulnerable -- 2.6.1 Our Image of the Legal Self -- 2.6.2 Autonomy -- 2.6.3 Duties to the Vulnerable -- 2.6.4 The Goodness of Vulnerability -- 2.6.5 Vulnerability and Power -- 2.7 Criticisms of the Claim -- 2.8 Conclusion -- 3 Law and the Caring Self -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 The Definition of Care -- 3.2.1 Meeting Needs -- 3.2.2 Respect -- 3.2.3 Responsibility -- 3.2.4 Relationality -- 3.3 Care Ethics -- 3.3.1 Care Is Part of Being Human -- 3.3.2 Emotions Are Ethically Significant -- 3.3.3 Intermingled Interests -- 3.3.4 The Importance of Responsibilities -- 3.3.5 The Importance of Non-Abstraction -- 3.3.6 Gender and an Ethics of Care -- 3.4 The Disability Critique of Care Ethics -- 3.5 Care Ethics and the Law.
3.6 State Support of Care -- 3.7 Conclusion -- 4 Law and the Abused Self -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Statistics -- 4.3 Defining Intimate Abuse -- 4.3.1 International Definitions -- 4.3.2 UK Governmental Definitions -- 4.3.3 Discussions of Domestic Violence Definitions -- 4.4 Developing a Definition -- 4.4.1 Intimate Abuse as 'Coercive Control' -- 4.4.2 Intimate Abuse as a Breach of Trust of an Intimate Relationship -- 4.4.3 Intimate Abuse and Structural Inequality -- 4.5 Intimate Abuse and Children -- 4.6 Developing a Legal Response -- 4.7 Conclusion -- 5 Medical Law and the Relational Self -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Bodies and Body Ownership -- 5.2.1 The Traditional Common Law Approach: Res Nullius -- 5.2.2 The Case for Property -- 5.2.3 The Case for a Relational Understanding -- 5.2.4 Resolving Cases -- 5.2.4.1 Yearworth v. North Bristol NHS Trust -- 5.2.4.2 A, B and Others v. Leeds Teaching Hospital -- 5.2.4.3 Evans v. UK -- 5.2.5 Conclusion on Body Parts -- 5.3 Capacity -- 5.3.1 Autonomy and Capacity -- 5.3.2 Individualised Assessment of Capacity -- 5.3.3 The Presumption of Capacity -- 5.3.4 Blurring the Capacity/Non-capacity Line -- 5.3.5 Solving the Problem -- 5.3.6 Conclusions on Capacity -- 5.4 Best Interests -- 5.5 Personhood -- 5.5.1 Mental Capacities -- 5.5.2 Challenges to the Mental Capacities Approach -- 5.5.3 Membership of a Human Community -- 5.5.4 Problems with the Membership of Human Community Approach -- 5.5.5 Developing a Relational Account of Personhood -- 5.5.6 Pregnancy -- 5.6 Conclusion -- 6 Family Law and the Relational Self -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 The Family of Family Law -- 6.2.1 The Community Model -- 6.2.2 The Contractual Model -- 6.2.3 Rights-Based Model -- 6.2.4 Caring Family Law -- 6.3 Remedying Unequal Distribution of Relational Advantages or Disadvantages -- 6.3.1 Pre-Nuptial Agreements -- 6.4 Parenthood.
6.5 Parental Responsibility -- 6.6 Disputes over Children -- 6.7 Conclusion -- 7 Criminal Law and the Relational Self -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Relational Harms -- 7.2.1 Dhaliwal -- 7.2.2 Marital Rape -- 7.2.3 BDSM -- 7.2.4 Acknowledgement of Relational Harms -- 7.3 Consent and the Criminal Law -- 7.3.1 Theft -- 7.3.2 Consent to Sexual Relations -- 7.4 Exploitation -- 7.5 Relational Blame and Joint Enterprise -- 7.6 Conclusion -- 8 Concluding Thoughts -- Index.
ISBN 9781108637497 (electronic bk.)
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